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ABSTRACT: The privatisation of communal assets tends to be presented as an 
irreversible linear movement that was driven from above. Based on a case study 
(Navarre, 19th century), this article seeks to give greater prominence to local players and 
their response to changing circumstances. The process thus appears less linear and 
compact by revealing certain anomalies, such as the reversibility of certain sales or the 
alienation of partial ownership rights that were compatible with the preservation of 
rights of use in favour of local councils and households, as an example of institutional 
bricolage. Against a backdrop of war and municipal bankruptcy, the privatisation of 
collective lands between 1808 and 1860 followed various paths, each one benefitting 
different social classes. Borrowers, outside investors, and wealthy people accumulated 
large estates, but there was also a chance for peasants and local people to become 
property owners. The recovery of part of these lands on the back of social conflicts from 
1884 onwards confirms that privatisation was not a fait accompli. 
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From the early modern period onwards, and at different times and at a different pace, 
European countries witnessed the privatisation of common land, which by definition 
meant repealing collective rights of use over this land (e.g., grazing livestock, gathering 
fuel and other forest resources, and even ploughing and cultivating). Historians have 
identified two processes that prompted this: first, “enclosure”, that is “ending the 
exercise of common use-rights over land, usually accompanied by the construction of a 
physical barrier around the land”; and, second, “privatisation”, understood as “the 
transfer to individual ownership of previously collectively owned land”.1 In conceptual 
terms, communal property regimes thus took two forms: ‘operational’ rights and 
‘collective-choice’ rights, each one of them allowing the exercise of different actions 
within a ‘bundle’ of rights. The right of access and the right of withdrawal or taking 
define use, whilst ownership also includes the rights of management, exclusion, and 
alienation.2 Taking this distinction into account, past research has revealed different 
possibilities for combining the exercise of the bundle of property rights by individuals 
and collectives. Table 1 summarises four alternatives. Individual use and ownership 
identify private property, the most extended formula, associated with the development 
of capitalism. The opposite is collective ownership and use that define common 
property. There are other interim options, too. Collective use over individual ownership 
was commonplace both in the British tradition, until the enclosure movement put an end 
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to it, and in Roman Law countries, where such rights of use were known as ’profit á 
prendre’ (right to take) or ‘servitudes’ (servidumbres in Spanish).3 Finally, individual 
use over collective ownership can also be found, for instance, when communal pastures 
were leased to stockbreeders in short-term contracts, or when communal land was 
distributed for individual cultivation as allotments in a long-term scheme. These cases 
involved a sort of individualisation without privatisation.4 
 
Table 1. A conceptual framework for the commons: typologies of land according to 
ownership and use rights 
Ownership ↓ / Use → Individual  Collective 
Individual Enclosed private lands Open fields (open private lands) 
Collective Common allotments 




Until the 1980s, historical narratives tended to describe the processes of enclosure and 
privatisation (i.e., equalising individual use-rights and ownership) as necessary 
companions to modernisation and economic growth. For North and Thomas, for 
instance, the transformation from communal to private ownership was the inevitable 
outcome of the increase in population, prices and rents, which led to a more efficient 
organisation of the economy through a better design of incentives.5 It seemed to be a 
linear, inexorable fate, as in a Greek tragedy. However, common lands did not totally 
disappear in Europe, and far from being a footnote of “rare and curious miniatures of 
archaic character”, their survival in industrialised countries defies simplistic 
explanations.6  
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a shift in the consideration of common property 
regimes. Interdisciplinary approaches to the question of sustainability and a second 
generation of New Institutional Economics have provided a renewed perspective on 
long-standing communal organisations. These studies contend that a certain degree of 
social and ecological efficiency has allowed communal arrangements to survive for 
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centuries, and have sought to understand their rationale. 7  The reappraisal of the 
common property regime in the social sciences has also had a parallel in historiography. 
Numerous works published over the past two decades provide a renewed narrative that 
dismisses the old stereotype of mismanaged residual property.8 
In the narrative that emerges from these studies, the process of dismantling common 
property regimes is not a natural consequence of demographic and economic growth, 
but instead the outcome of social interactions and political struggles in specific 
historical contexts. This was already the perspective adopted by influential Marxist 
historians, such as M. Bloch and E. P. Thompson.9 If there are confrontations among 
social classes and corporations in defence of one or other solution, then the outcome 
may depend on the correlations of existing forces in each case and on external 
determinants, with no preconceived notions or linearity. This explains the uneven and 
limited process of privatisation that took place in several parts of Europe before the 
eighteenth century, derived from clashes between feudal lords and peasants or between 
neighbouring communities, as well as from the financial problems of local councils, 
aggravated by wars.10 
Between 1750 and 1900, as Demélas and Vivier stress, the nature, intensity and 
extension of this process totally changed, because the new economic thinking of 
physiocrats, agronomists and liberal thinkers provided an ideological platform for 
privatisation, and the modern state assumed the role of catalyst. The attacks against 
collective property rights, reinforced by doctrinarian notions and the rule of the State, 
were widespread and effective, although not wholly successful at first. The dismantling 
of the common property regime needed several rounds of legislative and executive 
actions in most European countries.11 This is a symptom of the existence of different 
projects for the commons within rural society, as well as of changing situations 
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depending on the political and economic context. Vivier and Brakensiek have shown, 
for France and Germany, respectively, the plurality of regional trajectories in countries 
where communities were governed by similar legislation. Both highlight the fact that 
rivalry and the correlation of forces within different communities could either delay or 
accelerate the privatisation process, and could explain the persistence of old attitudes 
towards the land. 12 Demélas and Vivier have also avoided the simplified and long 
prevailing image of a top-down impulse from governments, intellectual elites, and great 
landowners. State-centric narratives cannot therefore properly reflect the complexity of 
a process whose main feature is the diversity of social contexts and results.  
In the case of Spain, the General Disentailment Law of 1855 (Ley de Desamortización 
General), also named Madoz’s Law after Pascual Madoz, Minister of Finance, has been 
considered the start of the privatisation process. The Law was justified by the need to 
suppress the obstacles to economic development and pave the way for public wealth and 
wellbeing. More specifically, the Law sought to mobilise the land market, while at the 
same time resolving the State’s financial problems and facilitating the building of 
railways. Municipal lands were sold at public auction, with the State retaining twenty 
per cent of the sale price and the other eighty percent being delivered to the 
municipalities in the form of public debt securities.13 Research conducted from 1980 
onwards, however, has revealed that the process of privatisation began much earlier 
than 1855 and operated in several ways, including the distribution of allotments among 
rural labourers and decommissioned soldiers from 1766 to 1854, and the enactment of 
enclosure legislation (acotamientos in Spanish) by the Cadiz Parliament (1813).14  
There are no countrywide data on the volume and pace of the privatisation process 
during the first half of the nineteenth century or for individual provinces, but Navarre is 
probably the most documented regional case so far. Figures are given for Navarre as 
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regards the sale of lands arranged by local councils during the Peninsular War and its 
immediate aftermath (1808-1820), as too are the sales made by the Spanish government 
from 1862 onward pursuant to the General Disentailment Law of 1855.15 What we are 
still largely unaware of is the amount of land alienated between those two dates. This 
article fills this lacuna for one of Spain’s 50 provinces, by trawling through the sales 
made between 1820 and 1855, which provide an overall view of the privatisation 
process and a better understanding of its implications.16 
Common lands in Navarre had different profiles. As in other Spanish regions, most of 
these lands were controlled by municipal corporations, and only a registered resident in 
the village (vecino) was entitled to full access. These lands were legally classified into 
two types: those that were regularly leased and provided cash income for the municipal 
coffers (bienes de propios, or ‘patrimonial assets’), and those that were freely used by 
local people under council stewardship (bienes de aprovechamiento común, or 
‘communal assets’). In practice, however, these uses were not so clear-cut. 
Municipalities in dire financial straits often changed the assets’ purpose to obtain 
income from their lease. Some communal assets therefore changed their legal status and 
were considered patrimonial assets. In other cases, there was no formal change in status, 
but instead a duality of municipal accounting, with separate ledgers for patrimonial 
assets (‘ramo de propios’) and communal assets (‘ramo vecinal’). These changes did 
not usually affect all the other possible uses. For instance, for reasons of financial 
imperative, the pasture of a communal asset could be leased by the highest bidder in an 
auction for a short-term contract, but local people could still forage for firewood and 
acorns, hunt game, and quarry stone, for example, or practice seasonal cultivation. In 
order to facilitate the management of these lands and their use as extensive pastures for 
livestock, they were usually divided into large plots that were known by different 
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names, such as ‘dehesas’, ‘ejidos’ or, in the case of most of Navarre, ‘corralizas’.17 
Common meadows (prados) were reserved for working animals (oxen, horses, and 
mules), combining grass with the planting of riverside trees.  These plots were not 
physically enclosed, but their boundaries were clearly defined (with markers) and 
enforced by local stewards.  
This article’s aim is to report certain findings from a regional perspective to formulate a 
narrative on the privatisation process of common lands in which local agency and non-
linearity nuance the traditional importance attributed to state-centric and irreversible 
development outlines. The starting point here is to consider communal regimes from a 
multifunctional perspective, whereby the logic of these systems of organisation that 
linked natural resources, peasant communities and political powers tended to guarantee 
the reproduction of structures that were hierarchical and unequal to different extents. In 
short, it is understood that the communal regime did not necessarily operate in an 
egalitarian manner, nor did it guarantee the subsistence of the rural poor, unless the 
specific arrangement of internal power relationships derived from access to the land, 
among other factors, pushed in that direction.18 The notion upon which this approach is 
based is that of equilibrium, an unstable one, or better still, an uninterrupted succession 
of limited equilibria. 
This study is based on a detailed examination of exhaustive notarial records and other 
supplementary documents, such as municipal accounting ledgers, legal proceedings, and 
administrative papers. The article is organised into two sections: the first carefully 
examines the process of privatising the commons in Olite, a small town in the heart of 
the province of Navarre, while the second ups the ante to address the phenomenon from 
a regional perspective. Without forgoing the long-term approach, the greatest effort 
focuses on the period 1820-1860, which is hitherto little known. It is the prelude to the 
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State’s direct intervention of communal assets that was enacted in Spain in 1855 though 
the Madoz Law, but which did not begin to take effect in Navarre until 1862. The main 
focus of study here, therefore, is the decentralised process of privatisation that 
responded to the extraordinary circumstances that displaced the old equilibria, 
introduced the need to find unique solutions, modified the relationships of power that 
lay at the heart of the rural community, satisfied individual appetites and expectations, 
and led to further conflicts and solutions.  
 
2. A TOWN IN THE EYE OF THE STORM: OLITE, 1808-1854  
 
In the book, The Fatal Knot. The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the defeat of Napoleon 
in Spain, John L. Tone writes: 
“Wherever the communal and municipal lands were alienated, the result was 
poverty, depopulation, and social violence, as exemplified in the case of Olite. 
Beginning in the War of Independence, Olite´s town fathers sold off practically 
all the city’s lands to pay off war debts. A few big landowners, who promptly 
removed themselves from the city and became absentee lords, came to control 
the local economy, and as a result, Olite lost population during the nineteenth 
century. It was only after a long and bitter struggle that the community 
recovered some of its assets”.19  
 
The town of Olite is, indeed, the paradigmatic case in Navarre of the disposal of 
communal lands during the 19th century and of the social struggles to recoup those 
selfsame assets between 1880 and 1936. The protests of October 1884, which led to the 
death of four local people, shattered the peace and quiet of provincial life, highlighting 
the problem of peasant access to the land. In March 1885, in response to the Comisión 
de Reformas Sociales [Social Reforms Committee], reference was made to Olite, albeit 
without actually naming it, “as a historic town in Navarre, where Spain already knows 
that certain class struggles turn into bloody conflicts”. 20 The struggle for the lands 
escalated again in 1908, with occupations of estates and bitter legal wrangles, 
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culminating in 1914 with another uprising, with the outcome this time being three 
people shot dead by the Civil Guard and court-martial proceedings. Following these 
episodes of protest and repression, negotiations between owners and the council enabled 
the latter to recover 1,101 hectares of commons in 1885-87, and 284 hectares in 1916-
18, which were immediately divided into plots and distributed among the local people 
for their cultivation.21 Again in the 1930s, the desire for agrarian reform led to further 
popular mobilisations, which were crushed by the repression following the outbreak of 
the Spanish Civil War, with the outcome now being the murder of 45 local people by 
the fascists.22 
The interest here, however, does not involve analysing these struggles for the land that 
characterised the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but instead in understanding the 
nature of a privatisation process that had left too many loose threads. Martin Blinkhorn 
was already aware of this when stating the following:  
“properties acquired as a result of disentailment, or the alienation of ‘corralizas’, 
or both, were regarded by smallholders, tenants and labourers as the fruit of 
greed, dishonesty, the abuse of power and downright theft. Such attitudes were 
encouraged by the extraordinary complexity of the customary and contractual 
rights attached to ‘corralizas’, and by the ambiguities often surrounding the 
terms upon which ‘corraliceros’ had acquired them”.23 
 
What is meant by these ambiguities in the deeds of purchase? Why wasn’t privatisation 
undertaken in an unequivocal and unquestionable way? A study of this town’s 
experience may help to answer these questions. 
As a seat of the royal court in the Late Middle Ages, from 1407 to 1836 Olite was the 
capital of one of the Kingdom of Navarre’s five administrative districts (merindades), 
and in 1630 it even purchased a Royal Charter granting it the grand status of “ciudad” 
(city), even though its population in 1787 amounted to no more than 1,488 people. 
Although it was a large jurisdiction (83.2 km2), agricultural land in 1818 accounted for 
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only 29 percent of the municipal area (2,390 hectares).24 The remaining 71 percent was 
used for grazing cattle and sheep, with some woodlands of Mediterranean evergreens 
(Quercus ilex, Q. faginea, Q. pubescens). Most of this uncultivated land belonged to the 
municipality, either owned by the council (bienes de propios) or by the local people 
(bienes de aprovechamiento común), being organised into different units of use and 
management: corralizas (pasture estates) and prados (meadows).  
 
This distinction between ‘patrimonial assets’ and ‘communal assets’ meant that their 
management involved two separate bookkeeping arrangements; in the former case 
involving a de propios y rentas’ account, and in the latter, an efectos vecinales’ account. 
The latter recorded the income obtained by the council through the annual sale of 
certain easements (the grass from Monte Encinar, where the firewood was gathered free 
of charge by the locals, and the manure collected from several animal enclosures), 
which towards the end of the 18th century were used to finance certain expenses that 
benefited the local community, such as the wages paid to teachers, the midwife and the 
doctor, the repair of streets and paths, or the planting of riverside trees.25 As for the de 
propios assets, their management was more complex. Part of the corralizas considered 





































Corralizas and arable land at the end of the 19th century
Map 1. Olite (Navarre). 
Map sources: J. J. Montoro-Sagasti, La propiedad privada…, 8-9; 
ARGN, Riqueza Territorial, Olite 1870, ES/NA/AACF/1/001/02/02.08/02.08.02/02.08.02.01/366008
roads
railway
boundary of  ‘corralizas’





‘corralizas’ enjoyed by the ‘mesta’ that were privatized in the 1830’s
‘corralizas’ enjoyed by the ‘mesta’, then privatized, and recovered 
by the municipality following the 1884 uprising.
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agreement that was renewed every six years. In 1827, the following retrospective 
explanation was provided:  
“From a long time past until the years of wars and revolutions, the livestock 
farmers of Olite were accustomed to leasing the corralizas belonging to the 
town by paying the sums that were agreed between the farmers and the town 
itself, with prior permission from the Real Consejo de Navarra [Royal Council 
of Navarre], which granted it for six years, and in the year it expired it was 
extended, which meant it never came to public auction, because the town and the 
court of the Real Consejo de Navarra considered it highly appropriate that the 
farmers with their sheep should use the corralizas by paying the fair price, as 
otherwise many ills would be caused, especially in the time of the shearing, as 
not being guaranteed local pastures they would incur very high costs in 
collecting the wool, which would mean that because of these hardship the 
community would be left without sheep, seriously inconveniencing agriculture 
(upon which this community depends) because of the lack of manure”.26 
 
There were twelve corralizas, each one designed to hold 450 head of sheep, which the 
farmers’ guild, the mesta, was responsible for distributing among its members for the 
winter, and for which an agreed rent had to be paid. Between 1784 and 1805, it 
amounted to 729.50 reales de vellón27 (rvn) per corraliza and year, being increased in 
the latter year to 1,164 rvn (a 60 percent rise), before falling to 834 rvn in 1812. In 
1805, the agreement between the town and the guild of sheep farmers was extended to 
include the use of the large wilderness of La Plana, in the far south of the municipal 
area, for 3,126 rvn, which was added to the 13,968 rvn that the guild paid for the twelve 
corralizas. In addition, in 1806-08 the town also charged the guild 2,710 rvn for the 
lease of the summer pastures (from 29 June, St. Peter, to 29 September, Michaelmas), 
reserved for the lambs that would not survive the trashumancia, the seasonal migration 
to the summer pastures in the mountains. The arrangement of these easements required 
the head of the guild to draw up an annual list of its members (29 in 1807 and 1809, and 
25 in 1812) and of their livestock (7,882 heads in 1808, and 6,387 in 1812) and submit 
it to the local council. Three more corralizas (Cabezmesado, Corral de Medios and 
Mamplonete) fell outside this arrangement, being used by the council to collect funds by 
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auctioning them off to the highest bidder for three-year periods (5,586 rvn in 1803-05, 
and 8,044 rvn in 1806-08). Finally, one corraliza (Estremal) was set aside for the flocks 
pertaining to the municipal slaughterhouse, whose administrators paid an annual sum of 
4,168 rvn under that item between 1805 and 1811. All-in-all, the local council and the 
people of Olite accrued a substantial revenue (22,676 rvn in 1805, and 40,308 rvn in 
1807) for ceding the right to exploit the pastures according to two formulas: the direct 
assignment for an agreed price to two players of strategic value, namely, the local guild 
of sheep farmers and the municipal slaughterhouse, and the public auctioning to the 
highest bidder of three corralizas de propios and a communal one.28 The municipal 
scrublands also provided other income, such as that accrued annually by the auctioning 
of manure from the animal enclosures (4,110 rvn to the de propios municipal account in 
1805, and 3,293 rvn to the communal or vecinos account), and the amount collected 
from the sale of the trimmings from pruning holm oaks (306 rvn that same year).  
At the end of the ‘Ancien Régime’ the commons provided the local people not only 
with pastures for their working livestock, firewood for household consumption, and the 
foraging of different fruits, but also regular income that paid for a broad range of 
expenses (table 2). This annual income also served as collateral for securing council 
borrowing. In 1805, the communal or vecinos account was burdened with eight loans 
(censales) for a combined capital of 80,450 rvn, while the corresponding sum in the 
case of the de propios amounted to 281,535 rvn in fourteen loans (three of them 
arranged that same year at four percent interest, compared to the rate of two percent for 
the previous ones), and 41,684 for the municipal slaughterhouse. The level of 
borrowing, therefore, was already high (403,669 rvn), and the cost of servicing the debt 
amounted to 9,588 reales de vellón per year, a figure that seems manageable when one 
considers the amounts accrued through the leasing of pastures. 
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Table 2. Olite, 1800-1854. Municipal expenses and incomes. Annual average 
expressed in ‘reales vellón’ (rvn) at current prices. 
 1800-07 1808-14 1815-32 1833-39 1840-54 
Operating expenses 37,416 40,195 44,283 56,037 46,180 
Financial obligations 7,219 1,617 9,446 2,769 11,043 
Levying of taxes 12,857 111,332 7,801 78,738 22,378 
Debt redemption 0 6,134 38,174 13,112 20,835 
Total Expenses 57,492 159,278 99,704 150,655 99,986 
Index Expenses 100 277 173 262 174 
Index of taxes 100 866 61 612 174 
Land rents 32,294 31,715 18,840 6,638 3,230 
Other ordinary incomes 23,431 38,636 32,180 43,560 55,616 
Extraordinary incomes 3,301 86,475 44,714 99,597 36,489 
Total Incomes 59,026 156,825 95,734 149,795 95,334 
Index Incomes 100 266 162 254 162 
Index of land rents 100 98 58 21 10 
Note: this includes three sets of separate accounts: the depository of municipal property, Propios y Rentas (1800-54), 
communal property Efectos Vecinales (1800-11, 1815-20, 1822-31, 1834-42) and council taxes, Contribuciones 
(1818, 1823, 1825, 1833-35, 1839, 1846, 1851) 
Sources: Archivo Municipal Olite (AMO), books 60, 78, 82, 89; ARGN, Consejo Real de Navarra, boxes 36627, 
36628; ARGN, Diputación Foral, boxes 49133-49136, 49140; ARGN, Protocolos, Olite, Joaquín Erro, boxes 8391 
(143), 8396 (76), 8398 (144), 8406 (43, 82), 8407 (78-81), 8408 (20, 33-35), 8415 (14). 
 
This scenario, already subject to tensions, as revealed by the steep increases in the 
prices of grasslands and the aforementioned interest on capital, was suddenly turned 
upside down in 1808 by Napoleon’s military invasion and the outbreak of the 
Peninsular War. Olite’s location on the main road from Pamplona to Tudela, and from 
those points toward France and Zaragoza, made it a staging post for troop movements, 
whereby on 11 October the town council declared that “for many months the town has 
been supplying the French troops with provisions and for that reason all the branches 
upon which it depends have been completely exhausted, and for the past twenty days 
over four thousand men have been billeted there”. 29  The extent of these military 
demands over the next seven years both in kind and in cash far exceeded anything that 
had been experienced before (table 2), with the ensuing repercussion for the council’s 
coffers. 30 The extraordinary means used to deliver the rations in kind and the cash 
demanded by the occupiers involved unprecedented measures that subverted the old 
order, such as the imposition of levies on the privileged (the Marquis of Feria, the 
Bishop of Barbastro, and parishes of San Pedro and Santa María), or the seizure and 
sale of properties and silver from churches and convents.31 The council summed up the 
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urgency and confusion involved in meeting the tax requirements imposed by the 
occupying authorities and their troops in the following terms in 1818: 
“That in recent wars, and specifically because Olite is on the royal highway, it 
incurred such excessive costs through the presence of the French troops that, as 
these could not be met by the demands they made for sharing them out among 
the local population, households were called upon individually to make an 
increasingly greater effort in the financial expectations required of them, without 
keeping to the order that justice requires in fairness, and for the same they were 
given their promissory notes throughout the town; this has given rise to the case 
that the same people are pestering the town to pay from its coffers those 
advances or loans, whereby it is incurring numerous expenses”.32 
 
In short, the long-term municipal debt (censales) was increased by a huge volume of 
short-term borrowing in the form of local promissory notes for supplies and advances 
(calculated in 1814 to amount to more than 512,000 rvn), besides other sums due, such 
as that owing to the segment of tradesmen in Pamplona for payment of the ‘contribution 
foncière’ of 1812 (84,673 rvn).33 Faced with the prospect of the depreciation in value of 
such a vast number of promissory notes, the creditors (both large and small) saw the 
need to transform them into tangible assets, whether cash, land, or other property. 
Therein the pressure on successive councils from different sectors in the community to 
convert these debts into ready cash. 
Yet who made up the council? Until then, the members of the town hall had been 
chosen each year by drawing lots from three separate bags or sacks that held a certain 
number of names for the election of the mayor, four councillors to represent wealthy 
families, and two more to represent the less fortunate. This system, known as 
’insaculación’, provided a varied social representation on the local council (see figure 1, 
in which councillors’ wealth was expressed as a multiple of average tax wealth). This 
system was suspended, separately, in 1810 (when the Viceroy annulled the election and 
handpicked wealthier people for the office), 1814, and 1820 (when the ephemeral 
constitutional regime introduced indirect suffrage by the two parish assemblies). 
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Indirect suffrage permanently replaced the lottery system from 1837 onwards, after the 
promulgation of a new liberal constitution.34 Figure 1 shows the cycles in which the 
appointment of councillors seems to have favoured the common people (1816-19, 1824-
30, 1854), and others (1810-12, 1815, 1820-23, 1843-52) when the wealthy prevailed. 
 
 
Source: see endnote 34 
 
The sale of municipal property as a way of paying off the debt began in 1810, following 
a pattern that apparently sought to uphold the existing status quo. The process involved 
measuring, valuing and auctioning 28 plots of 0.54 hectares each for growing crops at 
‘Prado Fenero’, which were purchased by ten buyers.35 In addition, and foreseeing a 
possible alienation, instructions were given to value one of the corralizas de propios 
(Cabezmesado), explaining that the value of 172,200 rvn did not involve full ownership 
of the plot because “it consists mostly of lots of land that belong to the local people”, 
but instead only the right to exploit the pastures. A valuation was also made (at 800,000 
rvn) of the distant wilderness of La Plana, where the plan was to maintain the villagers’ 


















































































Social composition of Olite's town hall (1800-1855)
Member's wealth as a multiple of average tax wealth
< 1 > 1 < 2 >2 <3 >3 <5
>5 >10 >10 <25 without data Median
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576,000 rvn). Meanwhile, numerous plots of land were sold off, most of which were 
already under cultivation. The aim of doing so was to regularise a de facto situation, 
permitting labourers to legalise their occupation, accepting as their method of payment 
the promissory notes on advances, and requiring the payment in cash solely of an eighth 
part of the valuation figure. Table 3 identifies the buyers of these lands by matching the 
names to a tax rating of the villagers conducted in 1809. This list classified the heads of 
the household into eight groups according to wealth, with an additional one for the poor. 
The bulk of the land bought (62 percent) was concentrated into an intermediate segment 
on the scale (groups 3, 4 and 5). The richest (group 1) also played a major part (11 
percent), and even some of the least well-off were involved, albeit only on a sporadic 
basis.36  
 
Table 3. Olite, 1809-1826: Distribution of the buyers of common lands (except 
‘corralizas’) according to the tax classification made in 1809. Data in hectares and 
‘reales de vellón (rvn) at current prices. 
 Tax classification Buyers of common lands, 1809-1826 
Group No. % No. Plots Hectares % Assessment Sales price % 
1   11 2.9 4 61 92.25 10.6 12,698 12,698 6.4 
2 10 2.6 4 27 31.94 3.7 7,090 8,486 4.3 
3  30 7.9 19 158 245.93 28.4 55,990 61,172 30.9 
4  48 12.6 18 152 197.83 22.8 39,476 44,074 22.2 
5 29 7.6 11 51 91.81 10.6 18,058 18,740 9.5 
6  35 9.2 11 59 58.22 6.7 12,988 14,870 7.5 
7  32 8.4 2 3 6.74 0.8 2,480 2,974 1.5 
8  146 38.4 4 4 1.80 0.2 1,884 2,134 1.1 
Poor  39 10.3 1 1 1.17 0.1 364 728 0.4 
Not identified 0 0 22 107 139.56 16.1 29,650 61,934 16.1 
Total  380 100 96 623 867.24 100 180,680 197,810 100 
Sources: ARGN, Protocolos, Olite, Joaquín Erro, box 8378, no. 31, for the tax classification; Ibid. boxes 8378 to 
8399, for the sales deeds.  
 
A different profile applied to the purchase of grazing rights on the corralizas, which 
involved individuals in groups 1 and 2, as well as a number of non-residents. 
Cabezmesado was sold in 1812 for a sum (112,000 rvn) that was 35 percent lower than 
its valuation figure, as the local council reserved the right to recover its ownership as 
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soon as it repaid the money received (a formula known as carta de gracia perpetua 
[perpetual letter of grace] or pacto de retro [right of redemption]). Three individuals 
were involved in the purchase, of whom one (the Count of Ezpeleta) settled half the 
amount, paying a third in cash and the rest in promissory notes on advances made to the 
troops.37 The following year saw the sale of two portions of La Plana to an outside 
moneylender for 147,316 rvn.38 The third portion, including another corraliza (Venta de 
San Miguel), was ceded for 200,000 rvn to a consortium of twelve creditors (among 
whom was the aforementioned Count of Ezpeleta and four members of the mesta), who 
made a cash payment of 12.5 percent of that amount, with the remaining 87.5 in 
promissory notes on advances. The final price for the three portions was 40 percent less 
than the lowest valuation made in 1810. In 1818, the Count of Ezpeleta, who had held 
the office of Viceroy of Navarre since 1814 as the supreme authority in the Kingdom, 
approved a petition made by the parliament, the Cortes of Navarre, to legalise the sales 
made without the due formalities during the war, a short time before the Crown decreed 
the same thing for the whole of Spain.39 In 1816, the Count’s attorney had already 
sought to secure his ownership of Cabezmesado by offering 8,000 rvn to meet its 
valuation figure. The operation did not live up to his expectations, as when recovered 
and auctioned again, the corraliza was purchased by another outside buyer for 120,320 
rvn, despite the official protest lodged by the Count’s attorney.40 Yet his intentions were 
soon fulfilled when the council recovered the three portions of La Plana in 1819 with a 
view to alienating them once again.41 The auction held in 1820 reveals the interplay of 
alliances between local interests and outside players. The Royal Council of Navarre, the 
Consejo Real, had approved the sale, but on the condition that no loans were to be 
accepted as payment, solely cash. The bidding, which began 22 percent below the 
valuation figure, was hard-fought between two outside investors, one of whom (the 
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Count of Ezpeleta) had been purchasing property in Olite since 1798. Although a 
Basque called Miguel-José Iriarte submitted a better bid by promising to pay in cash, 
the Count garnered the support of several local people (belonging to groups 2, 4 and 5), 
who challenged the submission of that bid with the paradoxical reasoning that “if it 
were accepted it would mean that whoever had money could lay down the law”. After 
his final bid had been rejected, the Count ended up calling for the auction to be rendered 
null and void. When it was repeated, he was assigned the property in return for a 
payment of 680,000 rvn in cash and a further 200,000 rvn in the form of a four percent 
loan in the town’s favour.42  
This episode is enlightening for several reasons. Firstly, it testifies to the council’s 
flexible use of a sale with the right of redemption to finance its extraordinary expenses 
without forgoing the possibility of recovering the alienated assets. Furthermore, it 
confirms the creditors’ interest in turning their promissory notes into more secure assets, 
such as land and buildings, but also cash in the event of applying the right of 
redemption. It also reveals the interest that some powerful outside investors had in 
exploiting the council’s financial difficulties to build up their own large estates. 43 
Political influence and the alliances forged with local individuals played a key role in 
this process of monopolising the land. 
Even before the litigation arising from the previous indebtedness could be resolved, 
another armed conflict, this time a civil war, again sent costs and levies soaring between 
1833 and 1839 (table 2).44 The council this time had official valuation data from the 
land register that enabled a fairer distribution of the tax burden, whereby in 1833 one-
off charges were made on 11 percent rate of the cadastral wealth, on 56.50 the following 
year, and on 25 in 1835.45 Nevertheless, the level of default in 1837 amounted to a fifth 
of the sum of those payments, which meant that other formulas were required, such as 
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the sale of land for cultivation.46 Once again, the efforts made to use municipal property 
to gather funds with which to pay for military provisions became a flexible alternative. 
In 1835, without permission from above and without resorting to an auction, the mesta’s 
eleven corralizas (118,492 rvn), the two de propios (21,544 rvn), and the 
slaughterhouse’s one (70,000 rvn) were all alienated.47 The following year, the council 
created a new corraliza (Falconera, with a capacity for 400 head) on land that up until 
then had been used free of charge to graze local livestock, immediately putting it up for 
sale. The same applied to another one (Fontanaza, for 200 head) which had been used 
by a convent of monks until their expulsion.48 In October 1836, the corralizas were 
recovered, although they were auctioned off again between March and June 1837. The 
income from the two corralizas de propios and the eleven belonging to the mesta 
amounted this time to 210,293 rvn, 50 percent more than two years earlier, although on 
this occasion the amount paid in promissory notes accounted for 92 percent of the total 
price. Those who acquired property rights over the pastureland in this way were mostly 
sheep farmers that had belonged to the former guild, which by then had been disbanded, 
and which had advanced livestock for provisioning the troops. Finally, between 1839 
and 1841, with the permission of the provincial authorities, all these properties were 
consolidated, largely by the same bidders, settling the difference between the amount 
paid in 1837 and the value then recorded in the auction. Outside investors saw their 
opportunity to exploit the council’s weakness.49 The best example of this involves the 
slaughterhouse’s corraliza, recovered in 1836 and then sold off again in 1837 to 
Francisco Barbero, responsible for military provisioning in the nearby town of Tafalla, 
the new district capital, for a cash payment of 80,000 rvn. Once again reinstated to the 
council in 1842, it was auctioned off to a speculator from the province of Gipuzkoa 
(Miguel A. Amorena) for 166,346 rvn, which was paid in two bills of exchange. In both 
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cases, the sale included the right of redemption (limited to 40 years on the second 
occasion) and the two conditions of allowing the pastures to be used for working 
livestock by the local people and of respecting any private crops already being grown.  
The second post-war period brought certain developments, such as the full integration 
of the economy of the old Kingdom of Navarre within the Spanish market, and a 
particular form of political integration, which granted the provincial council, the 
Diputación, some room for manoeuvre in matters of local administration and taxation 
that was far more favourable than in other provinces (with these rights being referred to 
as the ‘foral’ regime). The upward trend in the economy boosted the returns on land 
purchase investments, making this a much sought-after asset.50  
The problem of debt continued to be the main concern in the municipal administration, 
compounded by the fact the short-term debt incurred during the war was raised by the 
deferment of the long-term debt, whose payment had ceased during the conflict (table 
2). In 1849, the council declared that it was overwhelmed by the accumulated default in 
the payment of interest. Being reluctant to cover its obligations through the distribution 
of levies on property wealth, arguing that “the local people are immersed in the greatest 
sorrow and destitution”, it asked the provincial authority to grant further permissions for 
the sale of land. This led to yet more sales of plots for cultivation on Prado Fenero, and 
the communal grasslands on Monte Encinar, valued at 90,000 rvn, were auctioned off, 
albeit with major restrictions for the buyer. These included limiting the use of grazing to 
a maximum number of livestock (800 rams or 1,200 sheep, with only those goats as 
required for leading the flock), a prohibition on “even the slightest” tilling, and the 
obligation to keep the livestock overnight in enclosures, leaving the manure for the 
town. The local people were also entitled to collect firewood (now in very short supply 
following the massive felling of trees throughout the century), hunt, and graze their 
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collective flocks from 1 December to 1 April. Three local livestock farmers attended the 
auction through their agent, bidding only 46,660 rvn, half the valuation figure. In spite 
of how low the bid was, the land was awarded to them. A new corporation successfully 
called for the annulment of the sale in 1854, based on the irregularities committed, and 
unsuccessfully looked for someone to advance them money on the rent. In view of the 
differences of opinions in the local council, the provincial council ordered the definitive 
sale of the land at public auction. That same year, it was bought for its 1849 valuation 
figure by three outside investors: a trading company from Tafalla (Arroyo, Ruiz & 
Zorrilla), a corralicero from the nearby town of Beire (Francisco Jaurrieta), and the 
widow of an ennobled military man (Countess of Espoz y Mina). The buyers again had 
to accept certain major restrictions, as the council held back certain rights for the local 
people, such as gathering firewood and hunting, as well as grazing their communal 
flocks from 1 November to 31 March. 51  The aim, therefore, was to make the 
privatisation of the most commercial exploitation compatible with the protection of 
those easements that guaranteed the local people’s subsistence. It was a delicate balance 
that soon gave rise to frictions. 
The social transformation process described here led to greater inequality. In 1818 
(according to the lists of taxpayers), the Gini index (applied here to tax assessment 
values) stood at 0.634 (0.616 if we consider only residents); in 1834 it rose to 0.680 
(0.649), in 1849 it reached 0.717 (0.684), and in 1860 it stood at 0.756 (0.730).52 There 
is a need, however, to discuss some of the points made by John L. Tone that are cited at 
the start of this section. Mass privatisation did not lead to depopulation, as by 1887 
Olite already had 3,071 inhabitants, doubling its 1787 population. Poverty was not 
strictly an issue either. It is true that a large number of households did indeed live on the 
poverty line because they lacked direct access to the land and depended on a daily wage 
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at certain times during the farming year. Yet output had increased, as had the 
opportunities for work. The cultivated area had increased by 27 percent over 1818 
(3,043 hectares 1889), but this applied especially to the land taken up by vineyards (426 
Ha in 1818 and 1,476 Ha in 1889), a labour-intensive commercial crop whose growth at 
the time was driven by French demand.53  
 
Table 4. Olite 1889. Distribution of land ownership (data in hectares) 
 Residents Outsiders 




Pasture Total No. Arable Pasture Total 
Without land 27 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 
Only common 206 0 188 0 188 0 0 0 0 
0-1 Ha 181 79 115 1 195 43 24 0 24 
1.1-5 Ha 163 362 114 18 494 36 71 6 77 
5.1-10 Ha 35 238 26 6 269 6 42 0 42 
10.1-50 Ha 43 763 43 100 906 4 83 32 115 
50.1-100 Ha 7 289 0 269 558 1 66 3 69 
100.1-500 Ha 3 159 5 633 797 7 253 1,130 1,383 
500.1-2,100  0 0 0 0 0 2 123 2,626 2,749 
Municipality 1 0 - 478 478 0 0 0 0 
Total 675 1,890 491 1,505 3,886 109 662 3,797 4,459 
Source: ARGN, DFN, box. 7280 (16127) 
 
The fateful events of 1884 need to be understood within this context, defined not only 
by greater inequality, but also by the opportunities provided by foreign demand for wine 
and the lack of access to reserve land that could be used to extend the vineyards. 
Between 1885 and 1887, therefore, and as a consequence of the 1884 uprising, an 
agreement was reached between the council and the owners of certain corralizas that 
led to the removal of this obstacle, with the ensuing distribution among 492 local people 
(206 of whom had no other property) of small plots of land (0.90 hectares) for 
cultivation, a third of which were immediately planted with vines. Table 4, based on the 
1889 tax assessment that lists taxpayers according to their place of residence, reflects 
the consequences of the processes described. It reveals the unequal distribution of the 
cultivated land under private ownership (with a Gini index of 0.817 over land in 
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hectares), the compensating effect of communal plots distributed in the recouped 
corralizas (which reduces the index for the entire surface worked to 0.695), and the size 
of the grazing area privatised between 1810 and 1854, a large part of which could be 
used for growing crops, in the hands of absent owners (45 percent of the total), whereby 
the Gini index for the entire area under private ownership rose to 0.927 (0.827 when 
taking into account the communal plots distributed a few years earlier).  
 
3. TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACKWARD: REVERSIBLE 
PRIVATISATION AND INSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE IN NAVARRE 
 
Olite is an extreme case in terms of the extent of the privatisation process, whereby one 
might wonder how far the rest of the province is reflected in this narrative. Table 5 
provides a snapshot of the pace of privatisation in the province of Navarre between 
1808 and 1907.54 It includes data on the number of plots sold, the surface area involved, 
the valuation figure, and the final sales price. The first finding is that the sales arranged 
during the stage instigated by the central government through the General Disentailment 
Law (1862-1907) involved barely a fifth of all the land under private ownership. 
Nevertheless, because these sales had taken place during a time of greater political and 
economic stability, and due to the competitive bidding at auctions, the property sold by 
the State amounted to 40 percent of the final sales price (with its valuation figure at an 
intermediate point of 32 percent). In other words, the sales made earlier by the local 
councils themselves, with or without the prior approval of the provincial authorities, 
accounted for over three-quarters of the surface area alienated, two-thirds of its 
valuation figure, and just over half of the final sales price. In short, decentralised 
privatisation in this province far outweighed centralised privatisation.55  
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Table 5: Balance of the sale of municipal property in Navarre, 1808-1907 (current 
prices in thousands of ‘reales de vellón’) 
 Estates Surface Assessment Sales price ∆ 
Period no. Ha. % rvn. (103) rvn. (103) % % 
1808-1820 4,261 18,122 12.4 10,351 10,956 21.9 + 5.8 
1826-1833 197 3,598 2.5 620 884 1.8 +42.5 
1834-1839 892 31,131 21.3 5,067 3,675 7.4 -27.5 
1840-1846 1380 34,067 23.3 7,135 6,391 12.8 -10.4 
1847-1854 924 17,296 11.8 3,250 2,759 5.5 -15.1 
1855-1860 868 14,092 9.6 3,581 4,847 9.7 +35.4 
1862-1907 1,992 27,735 19.0 11,272 20,384 40.8 +80.8 
Total 10,514 146,041 100 41,276 49,896 100 +20.9 
Total*  10,228 106,421  33,623 45,017  + 3.7 
Note: where there was no prior valuation, I have assigned the sales price. Figures for 1862-1907, given by Iriarte-
Goñi in constant prices, have been transformed into current prices using Sardá’s deflator. Total*: ‘corralizas’ 
repurchased by the town halls have been excluded.  
The last column reflects the variation (in percentage) in sale prices compared to assessment prices. 
Sources: De la Torre, Los campesinos, for the period 1808-20; Iriarte-Goñi, Bienes comunales, for 1862-1907; J. 
Sardá, La política monetaria y las fluctuaciones de la economía española en el siglo XIX (Barcelona, 1998), 301-307. 
ARGN, PN (deeds pertaining to various notary offices: endnote 16) for the remainder. 
 
  
The quantitative importance of each one of these stages varies according to the chosen 
criteria -surface area or monetary value-, as the final sales prices during the second 
quarter of the 19th century were on average below the valuation figure set by local 
surveyors. The most negative stage in this sense corresponded to the civil war years 
(1833-1839), when the final sales price was, on average, 27 percent below the valuation 
figure. Selling below the valuation figure was common practice in those operations in 
which the local council reserved the right to recoup the property by reimbursing the 
price paid. Table 6 summarises the timeframe and volume of those sales of corralizas 
that used this credit arrangement between 1834 and 1860. The final balance shows that 
of the 256 corralizas privatised using this instrument, 197 were subsequently recovered, 
whereby the net balance was 59 plots and 12,426 hectares, with a value of just over two 
million reales de vellón. The arrangement was extensively used during the First Carlist 
War (accounting for 74 percent of the revenue from the sale of corralizas between 1834 
and 1839), and continued to have a major presence (46 percent of those sold) in the 
post-war period, with its use becoming rarer as of 1847 (25 percent of the corralizas 
sold in 1847-54, and 10 in 1855-60). As also revealed by the annual series of net 
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balance of sales shown in figure 2, not all the sales made during this period ended up 
becoming private property. 56  Privatisation was seen as a flexible arrangement for 
dealing with fiscal and financial commitments, although definitive and irreversible sales 
gradually prevailed.  
 
Table 6: Navarre, 1834-60. Balance of the sale of large pasturelands (corralizas) in 
carta de gracia (sale with right of redemption).   
 Carta de gracia sales Repurchases 
No. ha. rvn (103) * ** No. ha. rvn (103) 
1834-39 130 28,544 2,732.7 74.4 -17 29 7,325 358.0 
1840-46 97 16,151 2,967.7 46.4 -12 77 16,601 1,735.2 
1847-54 19 4,737 696.6 25.2 -10 72 14,367 2,370.9 
1855-60 10 2,780 467.6 9.6 +52 19 1,493 380.6 
Total 256 52,211 6,864.6 37.0 -12 197 39,786 4,844.7 
*.- percentage of carta de gracia sales over the total sales of corralizas (calculated by auction prices) 
**.- Average deviation of the sale price over assessment value (%) 
Sources: ARGN, PN (endnote 16) 
 
 
Source: see endnote 16 
 
Table 7 shows the buyers according to their social position and the amount of land they 
purchased, as well as the method of payment they used. The buyer profile differs 
depending on whether we are referring to cultivated land or grazing plots. In the former 
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Figure 2.
Navarre (1826-1860): Sale and repurchase of common and 
municipal lands. Data in current reales vellón (accumulated)
Sales (rvn) Repurchase (rvn) Net sales (rvn)
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peasantry. In some cases, they attended public auctions, where they bought suertes or 
plots of land ready for cultivation. In others, they legalised arbitrary occupations, 
roturos, through the payment of a sum that the valuation surveyors considered fair.57 As 
regards the grazing lands, the purchases were concentrated among hacendados-
landowners (58 percent), individuals who in many cases belonged to the minor nobility 
(hidalgos), and who added a distinctive title to their name (don) as a sign of 
respectability. These were followed by large livestock farmers that owned migrating 
flocks of sheep or fighting bulls (19 percent), and tradesmen (17 percent). 58  Cash 
payments were made in similar proportions by hacendados and livestock farmers, being 
higher among tradesmen (59 percent). A greater proportion of these last ones were also 
more willing to accept the subrogation of long-term debt, while the first two tended 
more to use promissory notes on short-term debt, as they had been more exposed to tax 
pressure during the war. In sum, large swathes of land changed hands over the course of 
these years, leading to greater inequality in income within the heart of these 
communities, the strengthening of the elites from the minor nobility, trade and livestock 
breeding (together accounting for 82.5 percent of the amount of sales), and the loss of 
rents for the local coffers.  
A process such as this one, which increased the wealth of those segments better placed 
in the community and led to the powerful entry of outside investors, inevitably 
increased tensions in the countryside. Given that the traditional status quo had been 
swept away by two devastating wars, with profound changes in the political system, 
more marked social differences, and the loss of communal resources, how could a 
minimally stable order be re-introduced? 
 
Table 7: Navarre, 1826-60. Classification of the buyers of municipal property 
according to social categories. 
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 Buyers Surface (Ha.) Sale price Method of payment (%) 
Category No. Arable Pasture rvn 
(103) 
% Cash Kind Receipts Subr n.d. 
Clergy 6 53 3,712 797 4.3 5.4 0 80.3 7.8 6.5 
Aristocracy 4 56 245 370 2.0 14.6 0 14.5 22.9 48.0 
Landowners 203 560 50,059 8,317 45.4 43.2 2.4 34.8 12.5 7.1 
Traders 22 322 16,412 4,368 23.8 58.6 0 9.4 31.5 0.6 
Livestock 
breeders 
64 85 17,672 2,446 13.3 43.8 1.4 28.2 10.9 15.7 
Farmers 1,025 2,026 2,175 1,404 7.7 25.7 0.3 23.1 0 50.9 
Civil servants 9 11 1,635 328 1.8 51.7 1.5 46.8 0 0 
Associations 5 0 2,798 308 1.7 86.4 0 13.6 0 0 
Total 1,338 3,113 94,707 18,337 100 43.8 1.4 29.7 14.8 10.2 
Subr.= subrogation of mortgage; n.d.= no data 
Note: The figures corresponding to pastureland (corralizas) should be used with caution, as the balance of sales and 
repurchases has not been calculated. Thus, in some cases we will encounter double or triple entries, although this is 
not a problem for the analyses conducted here. 
Sources: ARGN, PN (endnote 16) 
 
An initial answer might lie in the double direction and protagonism of the privatisation 
process. While large swathes of pastureland were privatised through public auctions that 
benefited wealthy groups, more croplands ended up in the hands of intermediate 
segments in the community, in many cases without involving an auction, but instead 
through the payment of their valuation figure. This meant that the disruption caused by 
the alienation of large tracts of land to major investors, in many cases non-residents, 
was offset by the involvement of part of local society in the transfer of property rights. 
Secondly, the very terms and conditions under which privatisation took place tended to 
safeguard certain property rights in favour of local councils and households. Full and 
complete privatisation was the exception rather than the rule. When the lands for 
cultivation were alienated, specification was made of the reservation of the right to 
graze once the crops had been harvested, thereby rendering null and void the law passed 
by the Spanish parliament (Cortes de Cádiz) in 1813, which gave owners the freedom to 
enclose their plots. When selling the property rights over the ‘grasses and waters’ of the 
extensive corralizas, a series of easements were also reserved for the local people, 
thereby restricting the new owner’s full rights over the use of this property. In many 
cases, the deeds of sale required the purchaser to respect the cultivated enclaves within 
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the corraliza’s perimeter. In some cases, matters went even further, upholding the local 
people’s right to extend their cultivation by sowing new crops and planting vines. On 
other occasions, the deeds of sale recognised the right to collect certain resources of 
plant origin (firewood, cane, esparto), animal origin (game, manure), and mineral origin 
(stone, adobe, lime, gypsum) within the plot alienated. In other cases even, the buyer 
was required to allow the local people to graze their livestock on the land, sometimes in 
the form of communal flocks, and at others on an individual basis, albeit restricted to 
the labouring cattle belonging to those that had crop areas within the corraliza or in its 
immediate vicinity. In short, the transfer of property rights was not complete, and a 
combination of individual ownership and collective uses emerges in these cases (table 
1), or maybe it should be considered a combination of collective ownership and 
individual uses. The establishment of a hierarchy of rights is not an easy task, and 
depends on the stakeholders’ correlation of forces.59 
These developments fits well in the concept of “institutional bricolage”, broadly 
understood as a “process by which people consciously and unconsciously draw on 
existing social and cultural arrangements to shape institutions in response to changing 
situations”.60 Bricolage practices and the preservation to different degrees of these profit 
à prendre arrangements allowed a certain amount of consensus at the time of alienation 
by permitting traditional users to continue with their easements after the land had been 
sold.61 Although in the short term this change in ownership may have been socially 
acceptable, in the long term it became a source of conflict. When the stimulus of 
expanding markets favoured the conversion of pasturelands into fields for cultivation, as 
occurred with the French demand for table wine in the 1880s, there was an inevitable 
clash between the heirs of those who had bought the corralizas (understood as property 
rights over ‘grasses and waters’) and those who thought they were entitled to occupy the 
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land and cultivate it because they were local people (vecinos). During the first third of 
the 20th century, the conflict deteriorated and adopted new political expressions 
(socialism, anarchy). When in 1931 the first government of the Second Spanish 
Republic offered villages the possibility of reclaiming ownership of those assets that 
they considered had been stripped away from them through unlawful practices during 
the 19th century, local councils responded en masse, and the applications for their 
recovery swamped the offices of the Institute for Agrarian Reform. The process that had 
begun in 1808 remained unfinished business.62 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Debt crisis produces favourable scenarios for introducing far-reaching institutional 
reforms, either because there is no alternative or because they become a suitable excuse 
for justifying radical changes to existing structures. One should not, however, lose sight 
of the fact there is not just a single solution, and the one adopted will depend on the 
correlations of existing forces. During the first half of the 19th century in Navarre, a 
profound crisis affecting local council finances combined with a new ideological 
climate that was well disposed to the privatisation of land and with the appetites of 
wealthy social groups to give rise to a profound transformation of land ownership 
structures and greater wealth inequality. Unless the privatisation process witnessed in 
this province should prove to be an exception within the Spanish context, for which 
there are still not enough studies, the 1855 General Disentailment Law promulgated by 
Pascual Madoz, a progressive minister of Navarrese origin, can be better understood as 
an attempt by the government to direct and control a process that had been taking place 
spontaneously since 1808, and to use it to resolve the problems of the public treasury.  
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Privatisation processes and the dismantling of the communal regime led to the 
consolidation of a powerful landowning elite of diverse origins (major and minor 
nobility, tradesmen, livestock farmers, moneylenders), but also enriched certain 
intermediate segments among the peasantry. In 1929, a lawyer called José-Joaquín 
Montoro-Sagasti summarised these two different sides of the change when in a report 
drawn up for the local council in Olite he distinguished between two ‘tendencies’ in the 
privatisation process: the minifundista [small estate] and the latifundista [large estate]. 
Does this distinction reflect two different projects within rural society? Or should we 
consider them complementary rather than antagonistic? Ultimately, the former could 
make it easier to accept the latter. Yet this was insufficient. A transformation of such 
magnitude would have been hard to achieve without the traumatic experience of the two 
devastating wars (1808-1814 and 1833-1839) and without the spiral of tax levies that 
affected local councils and the community as a whole. Within that context, the 
privatisation of council and communal property may have seemed the right way to 
cover the council’s extraordinary expenses or to convert the short-term debt arranged 
with private individuals, thereby avoiding the need to resort to further direct taxation. 
Even so, the necessary consensus for the privatisation process involved using an 
intermediate formula between borrowing and sale, namely, sale with the right of 
redemption (venta con carta de gracia), which enabled local councils to recover their 
assets through a cash reimbursement of the amount collected from the sale. The 
downside for the council was that the amount received was up to a third less than what 
would have been obtained through an irreversible sale. The use of this formula did not 
entitle the buyers to make full and unrestricted use of the land, as it could be taken back 
if the amount was repaid, but in the worst of cases it would have meant transforming 
short-term promissory notes of uncertain liquidity into cash. Making privatisation 
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socially acceptable in the short term also involved ensuring that the deeds of sale 
included several easements in favour of households and the local council, such as the 
exploitation of pastures for communal flocks or labouring cattle, gathering firewood, 
and even crop farming within the corralizas sold. Institutional bricolage allowed to 
make compatible the satisfaction of private appropriation and a partial maintenance of 
collective uses. 
The privatisation process in this case was, therefore, neither complete nor irreversible. 
gThis may have facilitated its social acceptance in the affected villages over the short 
term, but in the long term it led to a latent conflict among those vying for the pre-
eminence of their property rights over the land. When it came to a head, as in the case of 
Olite in the 1880s, it prompted a recovery of property rights in favour of the 
municipality and, in the end, of the landless labourers that pressed for an allotment. The 
transformation of collective use and ownership into individual ownership and use was 
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